Knowledge Is Power: How Implementing Affirmative Disclosures under the Jobs Act Could Promote and Protect Benefit Corporations and Their Investors by Farley, Laura A.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
2015
Knowledge Is Power: How Implementing
Affirmative Disclosures under the Jobs Act Could
Promote and Protect Benefit Corporations and
Their Investors
Laura A. Farley
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Farley, Laura A., "Knowledge Is Power: How Implementing Affirmative Disclosures under the Jobs Act Could Promote and Protect
Benefit Corporations and Their Investors" (2015). Minnesota Law Review. 260.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/260
FARLEY_4fmt 4/10/2015 12:17 PM 
 
1507 
Note 
 
Knowledge Is Power: How Implementing 
Affirmative Disclosures Under the JOBS Act 
Could Promote and Protect Benefit Corporations 
and Their Investors 
Laura A. Farley* 
“Build the best product, cause no unnecessary harm, use 
business to inspire and implement solutions to the environmen-
tal crisis.”1 This is the mission statement of Patagonia, a Cali-
fornia-based company that has gained international popularity 
and become one of the most successful outdoor clothing brands 
in the United States.2 Nevertheless, the company’s socially-
minded mission seems to be at odds with the traditional notion 
of a corporation: how can a company pursue mission-based 
goals and maximize profits? In the past, mission-based busi-
nesses faced the challenge of conforming to existing for-profit or 
non-profit business entities.3 Entity choice greatly impacts a 
business’s future and affects the management, operations, lia-
bilities, and taxation of the entity.4 Because of these inadequate 
and polarized options, socially-minded businesses were tradi-
 
 * J.D. Candidate 2015, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2010, 
University of St. Thomas. The author would like to extend her sincere grati-
tude to the editors and staff of the Minnesota Law Review for their hard work, 
Professor Brett McDonnell for his assistance throughout the writing process, 
and to her family and friends for their unending support and humor. Copy-
right © 2015 by Laura A. Farley. 
 1. Our Reason for Being, PATAGONIA, http://www.patagonia.com/us/ 
patagonia.go?assetid=2047 (last visited Mar. 9, 2015). 
 2. Id. 
 3. WILLIAM H. CLARK, JR., DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP, ET AL., THE 
NEED AND RATIONALE FOR THE BENEFIT CORPORATION: WHY IT IS THE LEGAL 
FORM THAT BEST ADDRESSES THE NEEDS OF SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURS, 
INVESTORS, AND, ULTIMATELY, THE PUBLIC 1–2 (2011), available at http:// 
benefitcorp.net/storage/Benefit_Corp_vs_Other_Alternatives.pdf. 
 4. See generally Matteo Tonello, The Business Case for Corporate Social 
Responsibility, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG., (June 26, 
2011, 11:46 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2011/06/26/the-business 
-case-for-corporate-social-responsibility.  
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tionally limited—for-profit entities focused on maximization of 
shareholder profits, while non-profit entities prohibited an or-
ganization from providing a private benefit.5 Moreover, con-
sumers and investors have demonstrated demand for socially-
minded companies and have reflected changes in corporate ex-
pectations. This has shifted much of the business community 
toward social responsibility and sustainability.  
Fortunately, companies like Patagonia have a new busi-
ness entity option that accommodates both for-profit and non-
profit goals: the benefit corporation.6 A benefit corporation is a 
business entity that allows companies to consider external, so-
cial benefits in addition to the traditional corporate obligation 
to maximize shareholder profits.7 These benefits can be very 
broad, and may include anything from concern for the envi-
ronment to education reform.8 Benefit corporations focus on a 
broader range of stakeholders, and provide businesses with 
greater operational flexibility to pursue strategies that promote 
a social benefit instead of an exclusive focus on profit maximi-
zation.9 While benefit corporation entity structures are availa-
ble to existing companies, legislation has primarily targeted 
small startup businesses.10 Numerous companies have utilized 
 
 5. See generally Josh Patrick, Assessing the Benefits of Becoming a Bene-
fit Corporation, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2014, 1:00 PM), http://boss.blogs 
.nytimes.com/2014/06/13/assessing-the-benefits-of-a-benefit-corporation; 
Stephanie Strom, A Quest for Hybrid Companies That Profit, but Can Tap 
Charity, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/ 
13/business/a-quest-for-hybrid-companies-part-money-maker-part 
-nonprofit.html (explaining the dynamic between non-profit, for-profit, and 
hybrid entities, such as Benefit Corporations). 
 6. Brian Cyr & Jessica Lubar, For Good and For Profit: The Emergence 
of the Maryland Benefit Corporation, ROSENBERG MARTIN GREENBERG LLP 
(June 2010), http://www.rosenbergmartin.com/our-passion/documents/Lubar 
ArticleJune2010.pdf. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Each state statute defines what may be considered a “benefit” for pur-
poses of the benefit corporation. See infra I.B.1 for a discussion of general and 
public benefits. For an example of a benefit corporation, see METHOD, 
http://methodhome.com/about-us (last visited Mar. 9, 2015). Method Products 
is an established home cleaning products company that has institutionalized 
their commitment to environmental sustainability through incorporation as a 
benefit corporation. 
 9. B Corps: Firms with Benefits, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 7, 2012), http:// 
www.economist.com/node/21542432; see also Jack Rodolico, Benefit Corpora-
tions Look Beyond The Profit Motive, NPR (June 18, 2014), http://www 
.npr.org/2014/06/18/316349988/benefit-corporations-look-beyond 
-the-profit-motive. 
 10. Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations—A Sustainable Form of 
Organization?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 596 (2011). 
FARLEY_4fmt 4/10/2015  12:17 PM 
2015] KNOWLEDGE IS POWER 1509 
 
this new entity structure to meet the demands of an increasing-
ly socially-minded market.11 Despite their popularity, however, 
it can be difficult for benefit corporations to obtain funding be-
cause the entity is often perceived as relatively risky as an un-
tested business model with unknown returns.12 
Despite the recent popularity of small and socially-
conscious businesses, the competitive nature and high entry 
barriers of capital markets has led to difficulty acquiring suffi-
cient funding for many small companies, including benefit cor-
porations.13 Furthermore, due to the unique structure of the 
benefit corporation, such companies face additional challenges 
securing investors and maintaining funding.14  
In 2012, in an attempt to address the funding issues all 
small businesses face, Congress passed the Jumpstart Our 
Business Startups Act (the JOBS Act, or the Act).15 The goal of 
the Act is to “increase American job creation and economic 
growth by improving access to the public capital markets for 
emerging growth companies.”16 The JOBS Act seeks to increase 
funding and growth through flexible rules and funding plat-
forms for small businesses, which allows investor solicitation 
and “crowdfunding” for small businesses (collectively referred 
to as “JOBS Act funding platforms”).17 Essentially, the Act re-
 
 11. Cara Griffith, Benefit Corporations: The Corporate Entity Of The Fu-
ture?, FORBES (Oct. 30, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/taxanalysts/2014/ 
10/30/benefit-corporations-the-corporate-entity-of-the-future. 
 12. Laws Provide Con Artists with Personal Economic Growth Plan, N. 
AM. SEC. ADMINS. ASS’N (Aug. 21, 2012), http://www.nasaa.org/14679/laws 
-provide-con-artists-with-personal-economic-growth-plan. 
 13. David Skok, Why Startups Fail, FOR ENTREPRENEURS, http://www 
.forentrepreneurs.com/business-models/why-startups-fail (last visited Mar. 9, 
2015). 
 14. See Briana Cummings, Benefit Corporations: How To Enforce a Man-
date To Promote the Public Interest, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 578, 588 (2012) 
(“Double bottom line corporations [like Benefit Corporations] struggle to raise 
capital because they do not fit the settled categories and expectations of exist-
ing sources of capital.”); see also Thomas Kelley, Law and Choice of Entity on 
the Social Enterprise Frontier, 84 TUL. L. REV. 337, 352 (2009) (“In a recent 
study of the emerging fourth sector, social entrepreneurs reported that their 
most pressing challenge was gaining access to investment capital.”). 
 15. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 
126 Stat. 306 (2012). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
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duces entry barriers that small businesses face as they try to 
obtain funding in capital markets.18  
The JOBS Act is focused on promoting small businesses 
and, accordingly, will greatly impact benefit corporations, many 
of which are small businesses. Still, because the Act focuses on 
all small businesses, it does not adequately protect benefit cor-
poration investors. Specifically, the Act lacks important affirm-
ative disclosures to inform, and thus protect, benefit corpora-
tion investors. Potential investors could be at a serious risk if 
they unknowingly invest in a benefit corporation believing it to 
be a traditional corporation with a profit-only focus. The omis-
sion of such protection in the Act has the potential to create se-
rious issues for those investing in benefit corporations and 
could ultimately hinder the future of benefit corporations. 
This Note argues that affirmative disclosures would be ad-
vantageous to both benefit corporations and their investors un-
der the JOBS Act’s funding platforms, and would ultimately 
promote investor protection and the national progression of the 
benefit corporation. Part I of this Note outlines the emergence 
of the benefit corporation, the foundation of state benefit corpo-
ration legislation, and the JOBS Act. Part II analyzes a prima-
ry issue currently facing benefit corporations: the ability to at-
tain sufficient funding. Part II then evaluates how the JOBS 
Act solves many funding issues for small businesses, but cre-
ates new, complex issues that undermine the protection of ben-
efit corporation investors. Finally, Part III argues that the best 
way to resolve the issues created by the JOBS Act is to amend 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations under 
the JOBS Act and impose affirmative disclosure requirements 
for benefit corporations choosing to participate in JOBS Act 
funding options. Affirmative disclosures for benefit corpora-
tions would act as a preventative safeguard to ensure investor 
protection. Such regulatory measures would positively change 
the landscape of benefit corporations and are crucial to secure a 
successful future for benefit corporations as they utilize these 
new funding platforms and continue to grow in success and 
popularity. 
 
 18. See id. See generally Chris Brummer & Daniel Gorfine, The JOBS Act 
Isn’t All ‘Crowdfunding,’ FORBES (Oct. 8, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://www.forbes 
.com/sites/realspin/2013/10/08/the-jobs-act-isnt-all-crowdfunding (explaining 
the fundamental aspects of the JOBS Act). 
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I.  STATE AND FEDERAL REACTIONS TO THE SHIFT IN 
CORPORATE EXPECTATIONS: THE EMERGENCE AND 
FOUNDATIONS OF BENEFIT CORPORATIONS AND THE 
JOBS ACT LEGISLATION   
Over the past decade, corporate expectations have shifted, 
driving the business community towards small business, social 
responsibility, and sustainability. One response to this shift 
has been the creation and popularity of the benefit corpora-
tion.19 Notwithstanding their popularity, benefit corporations 
have had difficulty obtaining financial success due to their new 
and untested structure. Moreover, benefit corporations face the 
same issues raising funds as a traditional small business, fi-
nancial challenges which have intensified over recent years due 
to national economic instability.20 To address the economic chal-
lenges of small businesses, Congress enacted the JOBS Act, 
thereby helping many benefit corporations. The Act creates 
new funding platforms for small businesses: equity 
crowdfunding and investor solicitation.21 This Section details 
both state benefit corporation legislation and the JOBS Act. 
Part A explains the foundations of benefit corporations as an 
entity. Part B expands on these foundations, and discusses the 
specifics of benefit corporation legislation and the differences 
between traditional and benefit corporations. Part C explains 
the current challenges facing benefit corporations. Finally, Part 
D discusses the JOBS Act and its potential to solve these is-
sues.  
A. THE EMERGENCE OF THE BENEFIT CORPORATION 
Corporate structures that combined a for-profit structure 
with non-profit values began emerging in the early 2000s.22 
These entities materialized to meet the needs of entrepreneurs 
interested in building a company focused on both profit- and 
mission-oriented goals.23 Such entities continue to grow due to 
 
 19. See Reiser, supra note 10, at 606. 
 20. See Kelley, supra note 14, at 352. 
 21. See id. 
 22. See Carter G. Bishop, The Low-Profit LLC (L3C): Program Related In-
vestment by Proxy or Perversion?, 63 ARK. L. REV. 243, 246–47 (2010) (detail-
ing the first legally recognized hybrid entity, the Low-Profit Limited Liability 
Company, a legal entity that merges charitable or educational goals with the 
LLC structure). 
 23. See Reiser, supra note 10, at 606; Patrick, supra note 5. 
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increased demand from consumers and investors.24 Though var-
ious types of hybrid entities exist,25 the benefit corporation has 
proven the most effectual and successful because its founda-
tions are based in corporate law, with which entrepreneurs and 
investors have a greater understanding and familiarity.26 
In 2010, Maryland became the first state to enact legisla-
tion adopting the benefit corporation.27 Since Maryland’s en-
actment, twenty-five additional states have adopted some type 
of benefit corporation legislation,28 while others continue to in-
troduce such legislation.29 Delaware, the predominant state for 
corporate law, has also adopted benefit corporation legislation, 
solidifying the importance and potential of this emerging busi-
ness entity. 
B. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TRADITIONAL CORPORATIONS AND 
BENEFIT CORPORATIONS 
Generally, a benefit corporation is a business entity that 
allows companies to consider external social obligations in ad-
dition to the general corporate expectation of profit maximiza-
tion and shareholder value.30 While there are some differences 
among states’ benefit corporation legislation, among the many 
states, benefit corporations are similarly defined and adhere to 
 
 24. Strom, supra note 5.  
 25. See, e.g., Bishop, supra note 22, at 246–47. 
 26. See Kelley, supra note 14, at 350–54; Reiser, supra note 10, at 594, 
601–03. B Lab, a non-profit that promotes benefit corporations, headed this 
progress, implementing non-legal certifications and commercialization to ini-
tiate the early popularity of benefit corporations. Powered by B Lab, BENEFIT 
CORP INFO. CTR, http://benefitcorp.net/about-b-lab (last visited Mar. 9, 2015). 
B Lab has been pivotal in the creation and visibility of benefit corporations, 
especially in efforts creating the Model Benefit Corporation Legislation, which 
has served as the foundation for state efforts in benefit corporation legislation. 
See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION §§ 102, 201(a) (2013), available at 
http://benefitcorp.net/storage/documents/Model_Benefit_Corporation_ 
Legislation.pdf. 
 27. Cyr & Lubar, supra note 6. 
 28. Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Flor-
ida, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, Neva-
da, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode 
Island, South Carolina, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, D.C., and West 
Virginia have all enacted legislation. See State by State Legislative Status, 
BENEFIT CORP, http://www.benefitcorp.net/state-by-state-legislative-status 
(last visited Mar. 9, 2015). Indiana, Kentucky, Montana, New Mexico, North 
Dakota, and Oklahoma have introduced legislation. See id. 
 29. See id. 
 30. Id. 
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the same fundamental requirements.31 There are three primary 
characteristics that differentiate benefit corporations from tra-
ditional corporations: corporate purpose; mandated director 
and officer accountability; and transparency requirements.  
1. Corporate Purpose 
A traditional corporation can have any legal purpose.32 Ac-
companying this flexible idea, however, is the general expecta-
tion that the goal of a corporation is to maximize profits and 
shareholder value.33 Though the scope of this concept has been 
the topic of much debate and litigation,34 it is generally under-
stood that a corporation “is organized and carried on primarily 
for the profit of the stockholders.”35 
Benefit corporations deviate from this traditional purpose. 
While pursuing profits, benefit corporations also have the “pur-
pose of creating general public benefit.”36 This expands the tra-
ditional corporate goals to include the promotion of general or 
specific public benefits. A general public benefit is defined as a 
“material positive impact on society and the environment . . . 
 
 31. See generally JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, The Evolution of 
Corporations in England and America, 1 TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
CORPORATIONS § 2:14 (3d ed. 2012 & Supp. 2014). 
 32. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 302A.101 (1981) (“A corporation may be incor-
porated under this chapter for any business purpose or purposes, unless some 
other statute of this state requires incorporation for any of those purposes un-
der a different law. Unless otherwise provided in its articles, a corporation has 
general business purposes.”). 
 33. Judd F. Sneirson, Green Is Good: Sustainability, Profitability, and a 
New Paradigm for Corporate Governance, 94 IOWA L. REV. 987, 1001–03 
(2009). 
 34. Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 735–38 (2005). 
 35. Dodge v. Ford, 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919); see also Katz v. Oak 
Indus., Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986); Long v. Norwood Hills Corp., 
380 S.W.2d 451, 475–479 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964); Granada Inv., Inc. v. DWG 
Corp., 823 F. Supp. 448, 459 (N.D. Ohio 1993). Compare Sneirson, supra note 
33, at 1001–06 (recognizing a duty to shareholders but arguing the business-
judgment rule renders this duty meaningless), with Jonathan R. Macey, A 
Close Read of an Excellent Commentary on Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. 
REV. 177, 179 (2008) (arguing that duties to shareholders remain paramount, 
even in the face of deference to corporate managers), and STEPHEN M. 
BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS §§ 1.4(B), 9.2, 9.3 (2002). 
 36. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 201(a) (2013); see also CAL. 
CORP. CODE § 14601(a) (West 2014); HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-2 (West 2014); 
MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-01(c) (LexisNexis 2014); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 14A:18-1 (West 2014); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1702 (McKinney 2003); 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.03(a)(1) (2014); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-782 (2011). 
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from the business and operations of a benefit corporation.”37 
Some states allow benefit corporations to adopt specific public 
benefits in addition to general public benefits, including:  
 (1) providing low-income or underserved individuals or communities 
with beneficial products or services; (2) promoting economic oppor-
tunity for individuals or communities beyond the creation of jobs in 
the normal course of business; (3) protecting or restoring the envi-
ronment; (4) improving human health; (5) promoting the arts, scienc-
es or advancement of knowledge; (6) increasing the flow of capital to 
entities with a purpose to benefit society or the environment; and (7) 
conferring any other particular benefit on society or the environ-
ment.38 
A general public benefit is required.39 Specific public bene-
fits, such as a societal or environmental benefit, are not manda-
tory.40 The difference between the goals of a traditional corpora-
tion versus a benefit corporation is important because those 
goals drive the operation, strategic direction, and obligations of 
company management.41 
2. Management Accountability  
Typically, officers and directors must act in accordance 
with the purpose and goals of a corporation.42 As discussed, the 
general purpose of a traditional corporation is to maximize 
profits and shareholder value.43 Consequently, directors must 
generally work to achieve those ends. In so doing, directors owe 
a fiduciary duty of loyalty and care to the corporation, and, 
thereby, to the shareholders.44 The duty of loyalty requires di-
 
 37. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 102; see also CAL. CORP. CODE 
§ 14601(c); HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-2; MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-
6C-01(c); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-1; N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1702(b); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.03(a)(4); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-782. 
 38. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 102; CAL. CORP. CODE 
§ 14601(e); HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-5(b); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS 
§ 5-6C-01(d); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-1; N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1702(e); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.03(a)(6); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-782. 
 39. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 102. 
 40. See id. 
 41. See generally Rodolico, supra note 9. 
 42. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea That 
For-Profit Corporations Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 148–55 
(2012). But see Lyman Johnson, Emerging Issues In Social Enterprise: Plural-
ism in Corporate Form: Corporate Law and Benefit Corps., 25 REGENT U. L. 
REV. 269, 273 (2012). 
 43. See infra Part I.B.1. 
 44. Andrew S. Gold, The New Concept of Loyalty in Corporate Law, 43 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 457, 457–60 (2009) (“A director’s fiduciary duty of loyalty 
has long been a core feature of corporate jurisprudence.”). 
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rectors to pursue the best interests of the corporation and 
shareholders above their own interests.45 The duty of care re-
quires that directors exercise good “business judgment” and use 
ordinary care in operating the business.46  
Nevertheless, there is a division in traditional corporate 
statutes among states. Some states permit officers and direc-
tors of traditional corporations to consider other constituencies, 
stakeholders other than the company’s shareholders, in their 
business judgment. For example, Minnesota’s corporate statute 
provides that the Board of Directors “may . . . consider the in-
terests of the corporation’s employees, customers, suppliers, 
and creditors, the economy of the state and nation, community 
and societal considerations, and the long-term as well as short-
term interests of the corporation and its shareholders . . . .”47 In 
contrast, other states, including Delaware, do not expressly 
permit corporations to consider such non-shareholder constitu-
encies.48 The difference between these so-called constituency 
statutes and non-constituency statutes presents an important 
difference in corporate common law among the states. The ex-
pectation of benefit corporations, however, is distinct from both 
constituency and non-constituency corporate statutes. While 
traditional corporate constituency statutes permit the consid-
eration of other constituents aside from the corporation and its 
shareholders, benefit corporations require the consideration of 
a company’s purported benefits.49 Accordingly, the management 
of benefit corporations has different fiduciary duties than the 
management of traditional corporations.  
Benefit corporation legislation mandates heightened ac-
countability requirements for management, which expands the 
fiduciary duties of officers and directors so that they are re-
 
 45. Id. 
 46.  See, e.g., NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 525 (1984) (ex-
plaining that the business judgment rule is the standard, though declining to 
apply it in this case); In re Farmland Indus., Inc., 294 B.R. 855, 881 (Bankr. 
W.D. Mo. 2003) (“Under the ‘business judgment’ rule, the management of a 
corporation’s affairs is placed in the hands of its board of directors and officers, 
and the Court should interfere with their decisions only if it is made clear that 
those decisions are, inter alia, clearly erroneous, made arbitrarily, are in 
breach of the officers’ and directors’ fiduciary duty to the corporation, [or] are 
made on the basis of inadequate information or study.”). 
 47. MINN. STAT. § 302A.251 subdiv. 5 (2014). 
 48. See Johnson, supra note 42, at 272.  
 49. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Making It Easier For Directors To “Do The 
Right Thing?”, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235, 238 (2014). See also Johnson, supra 
note 42, at 289. 
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quired to consider the mission-based goals of the benefit corpo-
ration.50 The directors and officers of benefit corporations still 
owe the duties of loyalty and care, but benefit corporation legis-
lation modifies this notion to include a broader range of stake-
holders and stronger levels of accountability from directors and 
officers.51 In addition to traditional fiduciary duties, benefit 
corporation legislation mandates that directors and officers act 
to support benefit corporations’ purported benefits. Specifically, 
management must consider shareholders, employees, the “in-
terests of customers as beneficiaries,” “community and societal 
factors,” the environment, and any other appropriate cause or 
group as designated by the articles or bylaws of a corporation.52 
These considerations extend to directors and officers.53 No sin-
gle consideration must be prioritized against another unless 
the benefit corporation’s articles of incorporation explicitly pro-
vide.54 The different accountability requirements in benefit cor-
poration legislation establish a fundamental difference from 
regular corporations, drawing a distinction from corporate 
common law, which mandates that directors “maximize the fi-
nancial value of a corporation.”55 These requirements also es-
tablish that directors and officers of benefit corporations will be 
held accountable for their efforts in furtherance of a benefit 
corporation’s mission-based purposes.56  
To substantiate these duties, many states have created a 
“benefit enforcement proceeding.”57 This proceeding creates a 
cause of action for specified shareholders, the corporation, or 
directors, if the benefit corporation fails to “pursue or create 
general public benefit or a specific public benefit purpose set 
forth in its articles,” or “violat[es] any obligation, duty, or 
standard of conduct under” the statute.58 The benefit enforce-
 
 50. See, e.g., MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 102 (2013). 
 51. Id.; see also CAL. CORP. CODE § 14601(c) (West 2014); HAW. REV. STAT. 
§ 420D-2 (West 2014); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-01(c) (Lex-
isNexis 2014). 
 52. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 301(a). 
 53. Id. § 303(a). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. § 301 cmt.; see also Reiser, supra note 10, at 595. 
 56. See Reiser, supra note 10, at 595. 
 57. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION §§ 102, 301, 305 (citing Dodge v. 
Ford, 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919); eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 
16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010)). A benefit proceeding does not necessarily preclude 
standard litigation, though. Because this is untested, it is yet to be seen how 
this type of proceeding will work. 
 58. Id. 
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ment proceeding further establishes that the directors and of-
ficers of a benefit corporation have a duty to act in accordance 
with the purported benefit, and will be held accountable for 
their pursuit of the benefits.59 
3. Operational Transparency 
Unlike traditional corporations, benefit corporations must 
maintain a certain level of transparency in order to ensure that 
they are acting in accordance with purported general and spe-
cific public benefits.60 Transparency requirements focus on the 
preparation of an annual benefit report, which must detail the 
“ways in which the benefit corporation pursued general public 
benefit during the year and the extent to which general public 
benefit was created.”61 The report is currently used for the ben-
efit of existing shareholders. If one is adopted, the report is ex-
panded to include the specific public benefit.62 The annual bene-
fit report must also include any difficulties that have hindered 
the corporation’s ability to create these benefits.63 Furthermore, 
the benefit corporation is tasked with assessing the “overall so-
cial and environmental performance of the benefit corporation 
against a third-party standard.”64 Finally, the annual benefit 
report must be displayed on the company’s website, if they have 
one.65 Such reporting requirements are not present in tradi-
tional corporate legislation and are a unique way to maintain 
and monitor the operation of a benefit corporation.  
Though the benefit corporation is different from a tradi-
tional corporation, this new business model has proven success-
ful as an independent entity.66 Nevertheless, while benefit cor-
porations have drawn substantial attention from entrepreneurs 
 
 59. See Cummings, supra note 14, at 593. 
 60. Id. 
 61. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 401(a)(1)(i); CAL. CORP. CODE 
§ 14630 (West 2014); HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-11 (West 2014); MD. CODE ANN., 
CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-08 (LexisNexis 2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-11 
(West 2014); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1708 (McKinney 2003); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 
11A, § 21.14 (2014); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-791 (2011). 
 62. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 401(a)(1). 
 63. Id. § 401(a)(1)(iii).  
 64. Id. § 401(a)(2). See Reiser, supra note 10, at 611 ( “All of the statutes 
envision public benefit assessments in annual benefit reports . . . with refer-
ence to the third-party standard. But, none of the statutes specify whether or 
how standard-setters should be involved in vetting public-benefit provision 
after incorporation.”). 
 65. Reiser, supra note 10, at 604. 
 66. See Strom, supra note 5. 
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and investors, they face the same challenges as a traditional 
startup and a number of financial challenges unique to the 
benefit corporation entity.  
C. FINANCIAL ISSUES FACING BENEFIT CORPORATIONS  
To date, the primary issue facing benefit corporations has 
been raising enough money to fund operations.67 Despite their 
popularity with business owners, benefit corporations have ex-
perienced difficulty gaining traction with investors.68 Benefit 
corporations are often less attractive than other options be-
cause they lack the firm, traditional incentives to invest, such 
as an anticipated return on investment. The pecuniary return 
on investing in a benefit corporation is not yet clear. It can be 
difficult for benefit corporations to obtain funding because the 
entity, an untested business model, can be perceived as rela-
tively risky.69 While investors and entrepreneurs have shown 
interest in the benefit corporation, expectations regarding the 
return on investment in a benefit corporation are unknown.70 
Accordingly, investors are generally drawn towards a tradi-
tional corporate model, which offers a higher return on invest-
ment, or a non-profit model, which offers full dedication to pub-
lic benefits and provides tax incentives for contributions.71  
The general unfamiliarity with benefit corporations has 
exacerbated funding issues.72 There is not yet precedent with 
which to evaluate issues arising from benefit corporations; 
there has not been litigation regarding a benefit corporation’s 
shareholder rights, nor has there been a benefit enforcement 
 
 67. See Cummings, supra note 14, at 588. 
 68. See Strine, supra note 49, at 251 (“But another crucial question for the 
benefit corporation to answer affirmatively is whether benefit corporations can 
generate results for equity investors that inspire confidence that companies 
doing it the right way will generate long-run returns consistent with prudent 
portfolio growth.”). 
 69. See id.; see also Reiser, supra note 10, at 618–21 (explaining the diffi-
culties that face small companies, especially benefit corporations, in obtaining 
funding). 
 70. See generally Resier, supra note 10.  
 71. Emily Chan, The Profitable Side of Nonprofits—Part II: Different Le-
gal Structures, NONPROFIT L. BLOG (May 13, 2011), http://www 
.nonprofitlawblog.com/the-profitable-side-of-nonprofits-part-ii-different-legal 
-structures. 
 72. See generally Reiser, supra note 10, at 618–21 (explaining the difficul-
ties that face small companies, especially benefit corporations, in obtaining 
funding). 
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proceeding.73 In effect, there is no clear foundation as to how a 
benefit corporation will operate and be held accountable if they 
do not achieve purported benefits or act in accordance with ac-
countability requirements. The repercussions are unclear, and 
it is unknown what rights shareholders will have to enforce 
compliance with either the profit- or mission-based expecta-
tions.74 Though a popular platform for entrepreneurs, the bene-
fit corporation’s newness can deter investors. 
Moreover, because benefit corporations are often small or 
startup businesses, they face the same general difficulties ob-
taining and maintaining funding. Small businesses have diffi-
culty obtaining funding due to the overly burdensome require-
ments to enter securities markets, which allow companies to 
gain capital.75 Additionally, as small businesses, it is difficult to 
effectively advertise and access investors. Congress has recent-
ly addressed funding issues facing all small businesses, which 
will also improve the situation for many benefit corporations.  
D. THE JOBS ACT PROVIDES A POWERFUL SOLUTION FOR 
FUNDING SMALL BUSINESSES 
The JOBS Act was enacted on April 5, 2012.76 The purpose 
of the act is to “increase American job creation and economic 
growth by improving access to the public capital markets for 
emerging growth companies.”77 This is done primarily through 
two new funding platforms for small businesses: equity 
crowdfunding and investor solicitation. As Part 1 details, the 
Act “establishes the foundation for a regulatory structure for 
startups and small businesses to raise capital through securi-
ties offerings using the Internet through crowdfunding.”78 Part 
 
 73. Strine, supra note 49, at 251; Doug Bend & Alex King, Why Consider a 
Benefit Corporation?, FORBES (May 30, 2014, 9:00 AM), http://www.forbes 
.com/sites/theyec/2014/05/30/why-consider-a-benefit-corporation.  
 74. Reiser, supra note 10, at 612 (“The statutes impose no clear frame-
work for directorial decision making. Without one, it is difficult to identify a 
metric by which shareholders might enforce fiduciaries’ compliance with dual 
mission.”). 
 75. Joan MacLeod Heminway, To Be or Not To Be (a Security): Funding 
for For-Profit Social Enterprises, 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 299, 319 (2013) (“The 
costs associated with producing these filings are significant and may be slight-
ly higher for social enterprise issuers . . . .”). 
 76. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 
126 Stat. 306, 307–08 (2012). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,429 (Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codi-
fied at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, 249). 
FARLEY_4fmt 4/10/2015  12:17 PM 
1520 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [99:1507 
 
2 discusses the new allowance for investor solicitation under 
the Act.79 These provisions were initiated to provide small busi-
nesses with an opportunity to reach investors and earn capital 
without entering the often costly and burdensome securities 
market.80 
1. The JOBS Act Establishes a Platform for Equity 
“Crowdfunding” 
The JOBS Act improves funding for small businesses 
through the creation of a regulatory platform for equity 
crowdfunding. Put simply, crowdfunding raises money from a 
large amount of people investing small individual contribu-
tions.81 Currently, there are a number of websites that facilitate 
crowdfunding.82 Nevertheless, the current form of crowdfunding 
cannot offer investors any share in the financial returns of the 
company,83 because selling shares or interest in the profit of a 
company equates to selling securities.84 Selling securities or se-
curity-like products requires federal registration and is highly 
 
 79. Fact Sheet: Eliminating the Prohibition on General Solicitation and 
General Advertising in Certain Offerings, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (July 10, 
2013), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2013/2013-124-item1.htm. 
 80. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,429. See Dave Michaels, 
Crowdfunding for Internet Stock Sales Approved by SEC, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 
23, 2013, 11:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-10-23/sec 
-to-vote-on-crowdfunding-plan-as-white-advances-jobs-act-1-. 
 81. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,429. See also Brummer & Gorfine, 
supra note 18 (defining crowdfunding as “the process by which capital is 
raised for a project, venture, or enterprise through the pooling of numerous 
and relatively small financial contributions or investments from the public, 
usually via the internet”). 
 82. Examples of current crowdfunding websites include http://www 
.kickstarter.com, http://www.peerbackers.com, and http://www.indiegogo.com. 
Although these websites offer funding options, they do not “offer securities, 
such as an ownership interest or share of profits in a business; rather, money 
was contributed in the form of donations, or in return for the product being 
made. The JOBS Act creates an exemption from the registration requirements 
of the Securities Act that provides for a form of securities crowdfunding.” 
Small Business and the SEC, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (October 10, 2013), 
http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/qasbsec.htm#capital. 
 83. Currently, small businesses can raise capital through “borrowing 
money from banks, other financial institutions or friends/family and by selling 
securities,” but if the company “offer[s] and sell[s] securities, even if to just one 
person, the offer and sale of the securities must either be registered with the 
SEC or conducted in accordance with one of the many registration exemptions 
. . . [this] would make your company a public company. Going public is a very 
significant step for any company.” Id. 
 84. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,429. 
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regulated under the Securities Act of 1933.85 Such regulation 
would trigger ongoing reporting to the SEC under the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934.86 These regulations and reporting 
requirements are costly and time-consuming, which prevents 
many small businesses from selling securities.87 
In response, the SEC has proposed rules under Title III of 
the JOBS Act (Title III) to facilitate crowdfunding as a legal 
platform to raise money without triggering the same SEC regu-
lation, often referred to as the “equity model” of crowdfunding.88 
The purpose of Title III is to “help alleviate the funding gap 
and accompanying regulatory concerns faced by startups and 
small businesses in connection with raising capital.”89 Title III 
makes equity crowdfunding accessible to both small companies 
and investors, as it allows qualifying companies to utilize 
crowdfunding to sell securities without the standard SEC regu-
lations. 
Specifically, Title III adds Securities Act section 4(a)(6), 
which creates an exemption from SEC registration under the 
Securities Act of 1933.90 Under section 4(a)(6), if a company 
meets three main requirements, it may participate in equity 
crowdfunding.91 First, the company cannot raise over one mil-
lion dollars over a twelve-month period.92 Second, individual in-
vestments within this time frame are limited.93 Third, the in-
vestor transactions must be conducted through a registered 
intermediary, either a broker or a “funding portal,” a newly es-
tablished entity under the SEC legislation.94 A company may 
 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Small Business and the SEC, supra note 82 (explaining the difficulties 
and burdens associated with registering a company with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission).  
 88. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,429. 
 89. Id. at 66,430. 
 90. Id. at 66,431. 
 91. See id.  
 92. Id. at 66,431–32. 
 93. The investment cannot come from an investor in an amount greater 
than $2,000 or 5% of the annual income or net worth if the investor has less 
than $100,000 in annual income or net worth; alternatively, if the investor has 
an annual income or net worth of over $100,000, the investor is limited to in-
vesting 10% of their annual income or net worth, but not to exceed $100,000. 
Id. at 66,433–34. 
 94. A funding portal is defined by the SEC as an intermediary platform 
that does not, amongst other things, “(i) offer investment advice or recommen-
dations; (ii) solicit purchases, sales, or offers to buy securities offered or dis-
played on its website or portal; . . . (iv) hold, manage, possess, or otherwise 
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only use one intermediary to conduct an offering or concurrent 
offerings.95  
In addition, Title III creates a number of regulatory re-
quirements for companies that qualify and choose to partake in 
equity crowdfunding. Among other provisions, Title III adds 
section 4(a) to the Securities Act of 1933, which requires that 
“issuers and intermediaries that facilitate transactions between 
issuers and investors . . . provide certain information to inves-
tors and potential investors, take certain other actions and pro-
vide notices and other information to the [SEC].”96 To protect 
investors, section 4(a)(6) requires issuer disclosures.97 These 
disclosures are required at the time of offering, on an ongoing 
basis with the SEC, and must be displayed on the intermediary 
platform.98 Registered intermediaries will also be required to 
provide communication channels to facilitate the sharing of in-
formation between the company and any potential investors.99 
Generally, “an issuer offering or selling securities in reliance on 
section 4(a)(6) must file specified disclosures, including finan-
cial disclosures, with the [SEC], provide these disclosures to in-
vestors and the relevant broker or funding portal and make 
these disclosures available to potential investors.”100 These dis-
closures include basic information, such as the name, legal sta-
tus, and website of the issuer; information regarding the direc-
tors, officers, and majority shareholders; basic business and 
financial information; and basic information regarding the of-
fering.101 Furthermore, there are ongoing disclosure require-
ments, which require an annual filing “with the [SEC] and 
provid[ing] to investors reports of the results of operations and 
financial statements of the issuer.”102 
The new equity crowdfunding platform will undoubtedly 
help small businesses, including benefit corporations. Many ar-
 
handle investor funds or securities.” Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, 
Frequently Asked Questions About Crowdfunding Intermediaries, U.S. SEC. & 
EXCH. COMM’N (May 7, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/ 
tmjobsact-crowdfundingintermediariesfaq.htm [hereinafter Frequently Asked 
Questions]; see also Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,435.  
 95. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,435. 
 96. Id. at 66,430 
 97. Id.  
 98. Id. 
 99. Id.  
 100. Id. at 66,437–38. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 66,450. 
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gue, however, that the disclosures are not enough, and that the 
Act lacks serious precautions to protect potential investors.103  
2. The JOBS Act Eliminates Prohibited Solicitation and 
Advertising of Private Security Offerings for Certain Small 
Businesses 
In addition to allowing equity crowdfunding, the SEC has 
eliminated the prohibition on soliciting and advertising securi-
ty offerings.104 Traditionally, companies sell securities if they 
are registered with the SEC or if they fall within statutory ex-
emptions from registration.105 Most exemptions “prohibit com-
panies from engaging in general solicitation or general adver-
tising—that is, advertising in newspapers or on the Internet 
among other things—in connection with securities offerings.”106 
As such, if companies sell securities within these registration 
exemptions, the company is prohibited from advertising and so-
liciting potential investors. There are various exemptions from 
registration, but “Rule 506 of Regulation D is the most widely-
used,” especially for small companies.107 Rule 506 creates a 
“safe harbor” for companies seeking to solidify their offering as 
a private offering, and, therefore, protect themselves from the 
burdensome SEC public offering requirements.108 Although 
Rule 506 traditionally required that these exempt companies 
refrain from advertising and soliciting their securities, Title II 
of the JOBS Act (Title II) provides for general solicitation. Title 
II eliminates the traditional prohibition of “general solicitation 
or general advertising in offering and selling securities pursu-
ant to Rule 506, provided that all purchasers of the securities 
are accredited investors and the issuer takes reasonable steps 
to verify that such purchasers are accredited investors.”109 The 
SEC specifies that accredited investors are “individuals who 
 
 103. See, e.g., Michael D. Guttentag, Protection from What? Investor Protec-
tion and The JOBS Act, 13 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L. J. 207 (2013) (explaining the 
lack of protection afforded to consumers under the JOBS Act).  
 104. Fact Sheet, supra note 79. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Rule 506 of Regulation D, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Jan. 1, 2013), 
http://www.sec.gov/answers/rule506.htm. Regulation D Rule 506 companies 
are required to fill out Form D, which is available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
about/forms/formd.pdf. 
 109. Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General 
Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,771, 44,771 
(July 24, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239, 242). 
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meet certain minimum income or net worth levels, or certain 
institutions such as trusts, corporations, or charitable organi-
zations that meet certain minimum asset levels.”110 Title II is 
thereby limited in its availability to small businesses, but is 
nonetheless a powerful tool to gain more investors and funds.111 
The Act’s solicitation platform will open a new avenue for 
small and startup benefit corporations to advertise, and in turn 
gain more investors, but there are numerous issues that may 
arise. A primary concern is the minimal disclosure require-
ments.112 The issuing company has minimal disclosure obliga-
tions triggered by Rule 506 at the time of offering; Rule 506 
does not have ongoing disclosure requirements.113 Disclosure 
requirements are, in essence, replaced with investor accredita-
tion requirements.114 However, this shift, from the corporation 
to the investor, may increase the likeliness of fraudulent prac-
tices and create information asymmetry among investors of 
benefit corporations; a scenario that has the potential to nega-
tively impact the future of these new entities.115  
II.  THE INTERSECTION BETWEEN THE JOBS ACT AND 
BENEFIT CORPORATIONS   
As previously discussed, the primary issue facing benefit 
corporations is the ability to raise and maintain enough funds 
to support their operations.116 However, with the enactment of 
Title II and III of the JOBS Act, raising funds is more attaina-
ble for all small businesses, including most benefit corpora-
tions. The JOBS Act aids in alleviating funding problems for 
benefit corporations, but it creates serious issues for the inves-
tors of benefit corporations: neither the SEC regulations nor 
state benefit corporation legislation includes affirmative disclo-
sure requirements educating and informing potential investors. 
Part A discusses the ways in which the JOBS Act alleviates 
 
 110. Fact Sheet, supra note 79. 
 111. Chance Barnett, The Crowdfunder’s Guide to General Solicitation and 
Title II Of The JOBS Act, FORBES (Sept. 23, 2013, 10:40 AM), http://www 
.forbes.com/sites/chancebarnett/2013/09/23/the-crowdfunders-guide-to-general-
solicitation-title-ii-of-the-jobs-act/3. 
 112. Brummer & Gorfine, supra note 18 (explaining the major change in 
the law and in what circumstances a company can now, under the JOBS Act, 
solicit or advertise their securities to investors). 
 113. See Guttentag, supra note 103, at 247–48. 
 114. See id. at 249. 
 115. Id. 
 116. See supra Part I. 
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funding issues for benefit corporations. Part B discusses the 
major issues the JOBS Act creates for potential investors, 
threatening the success of benefit corporations.   
A. THE JOBS ACT SOLVES FUNDING ISSUES FOR BENEFIT 
CORPORATIONS  
While it is impossible to resolve all financial issues facing 
benefit corporations, the JOBS Act largely alleviates many 
funding issues that benefit corporations currently face. Benefit 
corporations can now utilize the new equity crowdfunding mod-
el to raise funds or take advantage of the new solicitation laws 
to attract additional investors.117 These new funding platforms 
are ideal for benefit corporations for three primary reasons. 
First, benefit corporations are generally small, startup busi-
nesses, and the JOBS Act is intended to help such companies.118 
Second, current, non-equity crowdfunding is targeted at small, 
often non-profit, companies with a mission or greater social 
purpose.119 While this generally does not need to be explicit in a 
company’s mission to participate, this is what has driven, and 
will continue to drive, the popularity behind crowdfunding.120 
Due to their mission-based purposes, it is natural that benefit 
corporations will use these platforms.121 Benefit corporations 
inherently fall within this target mission-focused type of com-
pany.122 Third, benefit corporations will use solicitation because 
it is a simple, relatively easy way to gain investors. Benefit cor-
 
 117. The JOBS Act does not include any provision excluding certain entity 
types. 
 118. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 
126 Stat. 306, 307–08 (2012). 
 119. See, e.g., FIRSTGIVING, http://www.firstgiving.com (last visited Mar. 9, 
2015) (exemplifying a non-profit oriented crowdfunding site); KICKSTARTER, 
http://www.kickstarter.com (last visited Mar. 9, 2015) (exemplifying a commu-
nity and arts oriented crowdfunding site). See generally Taylor Corrado, 7 Top 
Crowdfunding Sites for Nonprofits and Higher-Ed Institutions, HUBSPOT 
(Sept. 9, 2013, 6:00 PM), http://blog.hubspot.com/marketing/crowdfunding 
-sites-for-nonprofits-higher 
-ed-li. 
 120. See Victor Luckerson, The Crowdfunding Economy Is About To Pop, 
TIME (Sept. 24, 2013), http://business.time.com/2013/09/24/the-crowdfunding 
-economy-is-about-to-pop. 
 121. See Strom, supra note 5 (“Unlike a straight nonprofit group, these 
businesses can tap into conventional capital markets as well as philanthropy. 
And unlike a for-profit corporation, the structure allows investors to empha-
size the social mission over making money, and to be supported by money from 
foundations.”). 
 122. Id. 
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porations have the potential to be successful using solicitation 
because of their profit- and mission-based model, which has al-
ready proven attractive to investors and consumers in the in-
creasingly socially-minded market.123  
Although there are some entry barriers to these platforms, 
they are minimal and are no different for benefit corporations 
than for any other business entity.124 It follows, then, that bene-
fit corporations will have the opportunity to sell shares in their 
company through equity crowdfunding without traditional SEC 
registration, thus increasing the company’s ability to attain 
funding.125 In addition to solicitation, a simple form of advertis-
ing to investors, the equity crowdfunding platform will greatly 
increase a company’s exposure, as its information will be avail-
able on an intermediary’s website, which potential investors 
will primarily utilize.126 As a result, if benefit corporations meet 
the SEC requirements, they will be able to advertise shares 
and solicit investors. This will greatly increase a benefit corpo-
ration’s exposure to potential investors.127 Gaining traction with 
such investors will ultimately enable the corporation to acquire 
funds in support of the business.128 While these platforms can-
not fully eliminate funding issues facing small businesses, in-
cluding those facing benefit corporations, they are an important 
and necessary step to level the playing field and access inves-
tors.  
B. THE JOBS ACT GENERATES INVESTOR PROTECTION ISSUES 
FOR BENEFIT CORPORATIONS UTILIZING SOLICITATION AND 
CROWDFUNDING UNDER THE JOBS ACT 
The funding platforms under the JOBS Act are advanta-
geous for benefit corporations, yet the increased access to inves-
tors and the funding they provide creates serious problems in 
investor protection. Although affirmative disclosures are a pri-
mary way to protect investors,129 neither the SEC nor states 
 
 123. See id. 
 124. The statute makes no reference to entity status. See generally 
Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 
306, 307–08 (2012). 
 125. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 94. 
 126. See Barnett, supra note 111. 
 127. See Michaels, supra note 80. 
 128. Id. 
 129. See Guttentag, supra note 103, at 249; see also Mary Jo White, Chair, 
Sec. Exch. Comm’n, National Association of Corporate Directors – Leadership 
Conference 2013: The Path Forward on Disclosure (Oct. 15, 2013) (“At the 
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have imposed adequate disclosure regulations upon benefit 
corporations. These regulations would be a crucial source of in-
formation regarding the nature of benefit corporations for po-
tential investors, as they could explicitly provide pertinent in-
vestment information directly to the potential investor.130 The 
potential damage caused by merely a single benefit corporation 
that defrauds its investors has the potential to negatively im-
pact the reputation and future success of all benefit corpora-
tions.  
The SEC’s proposed legislation of equity crowdfunding in-
cludes limited disclosures regarding the business operations 
and financial condition of the company.131 These disclosures, 
however, do not necessitate disclosure detailing the type of 
business entity.132 The entity of a company affects the nature of 
an investment in that company.133 While many benefit corpora-
tions may advertise their entity-status to their advantage,134 
there is no provision in either funding platform regulation that 
mandates the disclosure of the foundational differences be-
tween a benefit corporation and a traditional corporation.135 Be-
cause there is no affirmative disclosure required, a benefit cor-
poration would not be obligated to identify as such, leaving 
 
SEC, one of the most meaningful powers that we have to wield on behalf of 
investors is our authority to require companies to tell investors about the 
things that matter to them.”). 
 130. See generally Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation 
and General Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, 78 Fed. Reg. 
44,771 (July 24, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239, 242) (explain-
ing the disclosures required, which does not include any affirmative disclo-
sures regarding business entity or operations); MODEL BENEFIT CORP. 
LEGISLATION § 401(a)(1) (2013). 
 131. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66430 (Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codi-
fied at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, 249). 
 132. See Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and 
General Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, 78 Fed. Reg. at 
44,771.  
 133. See generally Anita K. Krug, Escaping Entity-Centrism in Financial 
Services Regulation, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 2039, 2042 (2013) (discussing the 
importance of the entity-status in financial regulation). 
 134. See Reiser, supra note 10, at 621–24; see also Benefit Corporations: A 
New Formula for Social Change, CTR. FOR ASS’N LEADERSHIP (June 2012), 
http://www.asaecenter.org/Resources/ANowDetail.cfm?ItemNumber=179687 
(“There is a strong case to be made for becoming a benefit corporation to gain a 
competitive advantage and attract investors, many of whom are specifically 
designing portfolios devoted to triple-bottom-line companies.”). 
 135. Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General 
Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,771. 
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potential investors unaware of the difference between a benefit 
and traditional corporation and, therefore, unprotected. 
Like SEC regulation, state benefit corporation legislation 
does not include affirmative disclosures regarding the nature of 
the business entity.136 Although state benefit corporation legis-
lation includes efforts to promote transparency of operations, 
such efforts focus on minimal initial disclosures to potential in-
vestors and then after-the-fact annual disclosures regarding 
the company’s efforts to attain their purported benefits.137 The-
se efforts revolve around the annual benefit report, which must 
be posted on the company website, and discloses completed ef-
forts done to achieve the company’s purported benefits.138 While 
this regulation is an important step to keep existing sharehold-
ers informed about business operations and profits, it is ineffec-
tive to inform potential investors about the nature of the specif-
ic business and what a benefit corporation model entails.139 
State legislation does little in the way of informing investors 
about the fundamental nature of a benefit corporation before 
reaching shareholder status, ultimately leaving them unaware 
and unprotected.140 Though some investors may seek to gain a 
better understanding of benefit corporations through independ-
ent research, many will remain unaware of the nature of their 
investment and uninformed as to how benefit corporations dif-
fer from traditional corporations.141  
Affirmative disclosure regulations are one of the strongest 
tools available to protect both sophisticated and unsophisticat-
 
 136. See generally MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 401(a)(1) (2013) 
(exemplifying the typical disclosures required of benefit corporations, which 
does not include explanation of the type of entity). 
 137. See id.; CAL. CORP. CODE § 14630 (West 2014); HAW. REV. STAT. 
§ 420D-11 (2013); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-08 (LexisNexis 
2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-11 (West 2013); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1708 
(McKinney 2003); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.14 (2014); VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 13.1-788 (2011). 
 138. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 401(a)(1); CAL. CORP. CODE 
§ 14630; HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-11; MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-
08; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-11; N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1708; VT. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 11A, § 21.14; Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-788. 
 139. See, e.g., MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 401(a)(1) (exemplify-
ing the traditional disclosures, which do not target investors). 
 140. See generally id. § 401(a)(1). 
 141. See Anne Field, Benefit Corporations, L3Cs and All the Rest: Making 
Sense of Those Confusing Choices, FORBES (May 25, 2012, 9:58 AM) http:// 
www.forbes.com/sites/annefield/2012/05/25/benefit-corporations-l3cs-and-all 
-the-rest-making-sense-of-those-confusing-choices/2. 
FARLEY_4fmt 4/10/2015  12:17 PM 
2015] KNOWLEDGE IS POWER 1529 
 
ed benefit corporation investors.142 The nature of an entity af-
fects the nature of the underlying investment.143 Since most in-
vestors will not understand the major differences in the opera-
tions, obligations, and largely untested shareholder rights of 
benefit corporations, information regarding the fundamental 
business nature of these corporations is important.144 Without 
further affirmative disclosure regulations, investor protection is 
compromised in three ways. First, without mandatory disclo-
sures regarding fundamental business information, many in-
vestors will be put at an informational disadvantage.145 Second, 
without affirmative disclosures, there is a greater opportunity 
to employ fraud and deception in an attempt to attract inves-
tors.146 Third, investors often need to be protected from “their 
own unwise investment decisions,” as investors may be attract-
ed by the brand of an investment, such as a benefit corporation, 
without weighing the value it will bring them as a sharehold-
er.147  
1. Without Adequate Affirmative Disclosure Requirements, 
Investors Will Be Ill-Informed About the Nature of Investments 
in a Benefit Corporation 
Without affirmative disclosures, equity crowdfunding and 
solicitation will create a major informational gap between the 
individual investors, as well as between investors and benefit 
corporations. Thus, many investors will be left undereducated 
and ill-informed about the nature of benefit corporations when 
investing in such entities through these platforms. Such infor-
mational asymmetry can significantly harm investors and the 
market.148   
Under the current JOBS Act, benefit corporations have no 
responsibility to educate or inform investors regarding the na-
ture of their business entity. The JOBS Act focuses primarily 
 
 142. See Guttentag, supra note 103, at 249. 
 143. See generally Krug, supra note 133, at 2042 (discussing the im-
portance of the entity-status in financial regulation). 
 144. Id.; see Bend & King, supra note 73.  
 145. See Guttentag, supra note 103, at 249. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 252. 
 148. See id. at 249 n.226 (“The goal of protecting investors from infor-
mation asymmetry is more of a means than an end. The concern for investors 
is not that they will have less information per se, but that various untoward 
results may follow when investors have less information.”). 
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on for-profit seeking investors.149 This is advantageous for bene-
fit corporations, but dangerous for investors. Benefit corpora-
tions often lose investors who seek either a maximized profit, 
therefore investing in a for-profit entity, or those who seek a 
non-profit venture to fulfill their mission-based interests.150 The 
JOBS Act funding platforms are aimed at individuals seeking 
to invest in a profit-based entity.151 Therefore, the solicitation 
and equity crowdfunding platforms will attract individuals 
looking to gain equity in a company to earn a return on their 
investment. Benefit corporations, however, are not required to 
focus on maximizing profits and shareholder value, and inves-
tors may not understand this fundamental difference in their 
investment. For benefit corporations utilizing these funding 
platforms, the fundamental challenge of gaining investors who 
either want for-profit or non-profit investments will be elimi-
nated. Rather than educating investors to solve the for-profit 
versus non-profit investment issue, the lack of disclosure cre-
ates a gap in information. In turn, the investor may be left un-
aware of the difference in their investment options, and may 
invest in a benefit corporation without realizing the true nature 
of such an investment.  
Furthermore, the lack of investor education is compounded 
in light of the newness of benefit corporations. Benefit corpora-
tions only began emerging in 2010, and are recognized in fewer 
than half of the states.152 Without affirmative disclosures, there 
are few ways in which investors could learn about these new 
entities. Even sophisticated investors may not understand that 
the term triggers an entirely different entity than that of a tra-
ditional corporation, with different and largely untested obliga-
tions to shareholders.153 This informational asymmetry can 
harm investors and markets due to unexpected and improper 
investor behavior.154  
 
 149. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,429 (Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codi-
fied at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, 249) (“Title III was designed to 
help alleviate the funding gap and accompanying regulatory concerns faced by 
startups and small businesses in connection with raising capital in relatively 
low dollar amounts.”). 
 150. See supra Part I.C. 
 151. See supra Part I.D. 
 152. See State by State Legislative Status, supra note 28. 
 153. Bend & King, supra note 73; Laws Provide Con Artists with Personal 
Economic Growth Plan, supra note 12. 
 154. See Guttentag, supra note 103, at 249 n.226. 
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2. Lack of Information Without Affirmative Disclosures 
Creates Perverse Incentives for Benefit Corporations To 
Defraud and Take Advantage of Investors To Maximize Profit 
The difference between traditional and benefit corporations 
has a major influence on how a company can gain investors. 
Traditionally, for-profit entities focus primarily on maximizing 
profit and thereby shareholder value.155 Under the traditional 
corporate entity, directors can face shareholder litigation if the 
corporation fails to serve its shareholders and instead works 
solely towards achieving mission-based goals.156 Therefore, 
shareholders implicitly incentivize traditional corporations to 
focus primarily on profits, which is advantageous for both the 
company and shareholders. As such, purchasing equity in tra-
ditional corporations is a relatively normalized practice. Even 
though, depending on the state, shareholder litigation can dif-
fer in scope, the benefit corporation is aimed at refocusing cor-
porations on more than profits, expanding the focus to include 
mission-based goals.157  
Equity in benefit corporations is a very different invest-
ment than that of a traditional corporation. Benefit corpora-
tions have different operational obligations, which affect the 
value of their equity.158 Further, benefit corporations have the 
ability to institutionalize the company’s mission, which endures 
through director, officer, and ownership succession.159 As dis-
cussed, benefit corporation legislation requires directors and 
officers to take actions that support that benefit corporation’s 
purported public and specific benefits.160 This obligation can be 
prioritized above profits, essentially allowing companies to sec-
ondarily consider profits and shareholder value.161 While this 
may attract some investors, a benefit corporation’s commitment 
to a social mission should not attract investors unless the in-
vestor is fully aware of the unique nature of the business and 
investment and how that will affect the value of their invest-
ment. 
 
 155. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 301 cmt. (2013). 
 156. Id. 
 157. See Cyr & Lubar, supra note 6. 
 158. See Reiser, supra note 10, at 621–24 (explaining the branding benefits 
of benefit corporations). 
 159. See id. 
 160. Supra Part I.B.2. 
 161. Supra Part I.B.2. 
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If investors are unaware of these fundamental differences 
between a regular corporation and a benefit corporation, the 
potential for fraud increases.162 Directors and officers of benefit 
corporations may be more likely to conceal the true nature of 
their business without mandatory affirmative disclosures.163 
The lack of disclosures may result in fraud or misinformation.164 
Moreover, benefit corporations that do not go so far as to com-
mit fraud may still use the benefit corporation “brand” to pur-
port their mission, while utilizing equity crowdfunding and so-
licitation merely to maximize profit.165 Because the entity is 
relatively new, benefit corporations may easily push their mis-
sion to attract investors, but fail to mention how this may affect 
a potential investors status as a shareholder. This issue com-
pounds the already existing potential for fraud under the JOBS 
Act, thereby misleading investors.166 Such an increased likeli-
hood of fraud and misinformation has the potential to damage 
the future of benefit corporations. There is concern that it 
would be burdensome on the company to make the disclosures 
on their own, and, further, that it could potentially steer inves-
tors in another direction if they had full information.167 As the 
regulations stand, however, benefit corporations can conceal 
their nature as a benefit corporation when attracting investors, 
and instead appear as a “regular” corporation, leaving investors 
vulnerable.  
3. If Investors Do Not Understand the Nature of the Benefit 
Corporation, Investors May Not Understand Their Rights and 
Value As Shareholders 
The nature of a benefit corporation differs greatly from a 
regular corporation.168 Therefore, shareholders have different 
 
 162. See Guttentag, supra note 103, at 248. 
 163. See id. (emphasizing the “fraud-deterring benefits of mandatory dis-
closure requirements generally,” noting that “disclosure requirements reduce 
fraud” and it is therefore “reasonable to mandate at least some basic disclo-
sure requirements”).  
 164. Id. 
 165. Cummings, supra note 14, at 589–91. 
 166. Many argue that fraud may occur under the new crowdfunding plat-
forms, due to both their newness and decidedly less stringent reporting re-
quirements and regulation; the SEC urges that this will be mitigated by the 
intermediaries and investor participation. See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 
66,428, 66438 (Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 
240, 249). 
 167. Id. 
 168. See supra Part I.B. 
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rights and value. Without adequate affirmative disclosures, po-
tential investors will likely be unaware of this difference.   
Investors often become shareholders in a small company 
with the understanding that, if the company is successful, they 
will see a monetary return, be it through dividends or an in-
creased return on their investment upon selling the shares.169 
However, neither of these benefits is guaranteed from a suc-
cessful benefit corporation.170 Benefit corporations balance their 
success differently, focusing on values that the company has in-
stitutionalized as equally or more important than profit and 
shareholder value maximization.171 While this is essentially the 
point of benefit corporations, investors should not participate in 
funding these ventures unless they are fully aware of the value 
of the equity in which they are investing. Unfortunately, the 
lack of disclosure regulations leave investors vulnerable to this 
misinformation. 
Furthermore, shareholders tend to invest with the under-
standing that they can hold management accountable.172 Bene-
fit corporations, however, are entirely untested in litigation.173 
Although some state legislation includes a shareholder right to 
action if the directors are not promoting the corporation’s pur-
ported public or specific benefits, this is not a uniform provision 
found in all states.174 Therefore, without full information, inves-
tors are subject to a new and untested realm of common law, 
and may be investing in a company without the ability to pro-
tect their rights to, and value in, the business.175  
With fully disclosed information regarding shareholder 
value and rights, these issues would be largely eliminated. 
 
 169. Capital One, What Is a Stock and Why Buy Stocks?, SHAREBUILDER 
KNOWLEDGE CTR. (2013) http://content.sharebuilder.com/mgdcon/knowledge 
center/Trade/stocks/what_is_a_stock/what-is-a-stock.htm# (explaining that 
investors buy equity in companies in order to earn a profit, either from the 
payout of dividends to shareholders or in the trading of their stocks in a favor-
able market). 
 170. See Benefit Corporations: A New Formula for Social Change, supra 
note 134. 
 171. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 303(a) (2013); Steven J. 
Haymore, Note, Public(ly Oriented) Companies: B Corporations and the Dela-
ware Stakeholder Provision Dilemma, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1311, 1338 (2011) (ex-
plaining the unique shareholder value of benefit corporations). 
 172. See Haymore, supra note 171, at 1338. 
 173. See Reiser, supra note 10, at 606. 
 174. See, e.g., 2013 DEL. LAWS CH. 122 (S.B. 47) (2013). 
 175. See generally Benefit Corporations: A New Formula for Social Change, 
supra note 134. 
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Again, the difference between a traditional corporation and a 
benefit corporation may be attractive to investors, but this dif-
ference should not include the capacity to attract investors un-
less they understand the true nature of a benefit corporation. If 
investors knew the true nature of a benefit corporation, they 
may better consider their investment, as the rights and bene-
fits of being a shareholder in a benefit corporation are uncer-
tain and untested.176 Without affirmative disclosure require-
ments, potential investors may be misled, and focus solely on a 
company’s social mission without realizing this social mission 
could compromise the investor’s potential profit. 
Furthermore, the affirmative disclosure requirements 
could be advantageous for benefit corporations.177 Though an 
untested business entity, investors are still interested in bene-
fit corporations. The return on investment is not clear, but 
many are drawn to the mix of profit- and non-profit based 
goals. Some argue that benefit corporations, in “doing things 
the right way,” will be “profitable . . . in the long run, because 
regulatory shortcuts, product quality compromises, and the like 
tend to get discovered and result in corporate failures and un-
derperformance.”178  
III.  THE SEC SHOULD ENACT LEGISLATION THAT 
REQUIRES STRONGER AFFIRMATIVE DISCLOSURE 
REQUIREMENTS FOR BENEFIT CORPORATIONS THAT 
CHOOSE TO UTILIZE THE JOBS ACT FUNDING 
PLATFORMS   
Additional regulation is necessary to encourage benefit 
corporation disclosure in order to inform and protect investors. 
Such changes should be introduced promptly so as to prevent 
rather than react to damage to investors and the reputation of 
benefit corporations in the market. Part A of this section ex-
plains why effective regulation must come from the SEC, as the 
JOBS Act is on a national scale. Part B suggests initial and on-
going disclosure requirements for companies that take part in 
equity crowdfunding. Finally, Part C suggests that there 
should be similar disclosures included in any solicitation for in-
 
 176. Haymore, supra note 171, at 1338 (explaining that there are vast dif-
ferences in the goals of traditional investors and socially minded investors 
that seek to invest in socially conscious companies such as benefit corpora-
tions). 
 177. See Strine, supra note 49, at 251. 
 178. Id. 
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vestors. If affirmative disclosure requirements are not enacted 
in either equity crowdfunding or solicitation, the success and 
feasibility of benefit corporations could be in danger. 
A. ENHANCED SEC DISCLOSURE REGULATIONS ARE MORE 
APPROPRIATE AND WOULD BE MORE EFFECTIVE THAN STATE 
REGULATION  
SEC regulation would be the best way to create further af-
firmative disclosure requirements for benefit corporations uti-
lizing the new advertising and equity crowdfunding platforms. 
There are three reasons that federal SEC efforts would be more 
effective than state efforts. First, such regulation would create 
a consistent disclosure requirement for all benefit corporations. 
Despite the fact that each state has different legislation, it is 
important to impose consistent disclosure requirements for all 
benefit corporations; this will protect investors equally 
throughout the United States. Second, SEC regulations would 
be more efficient than state legislation. A single legislative ef-
fort would be far more effective than attempting to amend ex-
isting state benefit corporation legislation and to force states to 
include such provisions in future legislation. Third, SEC regu-
lation would be more consistent with the already existing dis-
closure regulations of the JOBS Act than with state disclosures, 
and therefore more effective. Although advertising and solicita-
tion regulation includes minimal, informational disclosures,179 
further disclosure requirements would be consistent with gen-
eral federal security regulation,180 and would be cohesive with 
the equity crowdfunding regulation. SEC regulation is especial-
ly attainable for equity crowdfunding because the format of the 
SEC disclosures is flexible.181  
Nevertheless, because each state has unique legislation, ef-
forts at the state level could be effectively used to address the 
different variations of benefit corporations. Furthermore, fed-
eral efforts may be perceived as overzealous because benefit 
 
 179. See Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and 
General Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,771 
(July 24, 2013) (explaining the disclosures required, which does not include 
any affirmative disclosures regarding business entity or operations). 
 180. See Guttentag, supra note 103, at 249. 
 181. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,438 (Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codi-
fied at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, 249) (“[The SEC] recognize[s] 
that there are numerous ways to achieve [the goal of material disclosures] 
and, as such, [the SEC is] not proposing to mandate a specific disclosure for-
mat.”). 
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corporation legislation has not been enacted in every state.182 
Ultimately, while such state-level regulation may be effective, 
it would be more advantageous if disclosure requirements were 
instituted by the SEC, thereby making them streamlined and 
cohesive across the states. A federal disclosure requirement is 
especially effective in light of the fact that the new JOBS fund-
ing platforms are nationally available and primarily regulated 
by the SEC.183 
B. PROPOSED LEGISLATION SHOULD REQUIRE DISCLOSURES 
BOTH AT THE TIME OF OFFERING AND ONGOING FOR BENEFIT 
CORPORATIONS UTILIZING EQUITY CROWDFUNDING 
Benefit corporations participating in the equity 
crowdfunding platform established under the JOBS Act should 
have additional disclosure requirements. Such disclosures 
should be mandated at both the time of offering and on an on-
going basis.  
1. Initial Disclosure Requirements 
Equity crowdfunding legislation should be amended to 
mandate affirmative disclosures at the time of offering regard-
ing the benefit corporation entity structure. Requiring time-of-
offering disclosures is important in order to inform potential 
investors about the investment from the outset.  
This recommendation can feasibly be incorporated into ex-
isting SEC proposed regulation. The SEC has included in their 
regulation that the “[SEC] may require additional disclosures 
for the protection of investors and in the public interest.”184 The 
SEC is also considering including a disclosure requirement of 
“a discussion of the material factors that make an investment 
in the issuer speculative or risky.”185 Considering these SEC 
proposals, it is reasonable that it is in the best interest of the 
public to mandate affirmative disclosures for benefit corpora-
tions—their status as such is material to the business, and 
could increase the perceived risk to investors and lower the 
overall returns on their investment. 
 
 182. See Strom, supra note 5. 
 183. Although companies need to adhere to both state and SEC regula-
tions, the SEC’s regulations are generally stronger and more inclusive. Fre-
quently Asked Questions, supra note 94. 
 184. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,438. 
 185. Id. at 66,442. 
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The disclosures at the time of offering should include four 
elements. First, the disclosure should include a brief informa-
tional statement regarding the nature of a benefit corporation. 
This could be a boilerplate statement included to generally in-
form investors of the nature of a benefit corporation.186 Such a 
statement may produce difficulties, however, because each 
state has instituted a unique benefit corporation, making it dif-
ficult to mandate each state to produce a boilerplate informa-
tional disclosure. To entice states to adopt their own boilerplate 
based on the state-specific legislation, it would be advantageous 
of the SEC to create an example boilerplate statement to serve 
as a model.  
Second, the legislation should mandate that benefit corpo-
rations identify themselves as a benefit corporation, and dis-
close the benefits, either public or specific, that the company 
purports to support. This will inform customers of the mission-
based side of the benefit corporation.  
Third, the time of offering disclosure should include an ex-
planation of that state’s specific benefit corporation legislation, 
including the unique transparency, accountability, and share-
holder action provisions that may or may not be required in the 
state. Because each state is different, it would be crucial to 
make the differences clear to investors to maximize investor 
education.  
Fourth, the disclosure at the time of offering should include 
as an attachment the company’s most recent benefit report. 
This will give investors an idea of the company’s operational 
commitment to their purported benefit. An issue arises, howev-
er, when new benefit corporations, who have not yet made a 
benefit report, utilize equity crowdfunding. To address this 
problem, the affirmative disclosures should incorporate a provi-
sion requiring new benefit corporations to produce a benefit re-
port including all applicable information available at the time 
of offering.  
Benefit corporations and their proponents may oppose any 
additional disclosure requirements implemented by the SEC. 
The current disclosure requirements included in the JOBS Act 
have been decried as too burdensome on small companies.187 
 
 186. This identification may need to include both a broad and specific de-
scription, including what a benefit corporation is, generally, and any differen-
tiating factors of the state they are incorporated in. 
 187. See, e.g., Andrew A. Schwarz, Keep It Light, Chairman White: SEC 
Rulemaking Under the CROWDFUND Act, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 43, 46 
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There are also concerns that current disclosures are simply too 
costly and onerous for small businesses.188 In light of these 
complaints, the SEC may be hesitant to impose further disclo-
sures. However, the proposed disclosures for benefit corpora-
tions would be minimal. These disclosures would include either 
already existing information regarding the company, or would 
be standard informational statements regarding the nature of 
the entity. Though the disclosures would require additional 
work on the part of benefit corporations, they are worthwhile 
and important to the success of the business entity as a whole. 
They would notify potential investors of the nature of the in-
vestment, allowing investors to more clearly understand an in-
vestment before becoming a shareholder. In addition, they 
would force companies to be upfront about their status as a 
benefit corporation, limit the potential for fraud, and educate 
potential investors.  
2. Ongoing Disclosure Requirements 
The second element of regulation that should be imposed to 
protect investors is an ongoing disclosure requirement. Cur-
rently, ongoing disclosure requirements under the JOBS Act 
mandate “reports of the results of operations and financial 
statements of the issuer, as the [SEC] shall, by rule, determine 
appropriate, subject to such exceptions and termination dates 
as the [SEC] may establish, by rule.”189 The SEC should, there-
fore, mandate that benefit corporations include their annual 
benefit reports with the otherwise required ongoing disclosures. 
This additional disclosure would have little to no impact on 
benefit corporations, as they are already required to provide 
benefit reports under state benefit corporation legislation.190 In 
light of the relative ease of implementation, the SEC should al-
so mandate that benefit corporations submit these reports prior 
to investment to enhance investor education and communica-
tion, and to establish further accountability in benefit corpora-
tions utilizing equity crowdfunding.  
Again, many benefit corporations may argue that addition-
al disclosures are unduly burdensome. Nevertheless, because 
 
(2013) (attached to open letter for comment to SEC Chairman White, available 
at http://www.sec.gov/comments/jobs-title-iii/jobstitleiii-240.pdf).  
 188. See id. 
 189. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66450. 
 190. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-08 (LexisNexis 
2014). 
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these reports are already required by state legislation, the SEC 
should also require these reports be made available directly to 
investors on an ongoing basis.  
C. THE SEC SHOULD REQUIRE BENEFIT CORPORATIONS TO 
INCLUDE A DISCLOSURE REGARDING THEIR ENTITY STATUS IF 
THE BENEFIT CORPORATION UTILIZES THE NEWLY AVAILABLE 
ADVERTISING AND SOLICITING OPTIONS UNDER THE JOBS ACT 
Since benefit corporations are eligible and can choose to 
advertise and solicit investors, the SEC should mandate that 
the benefit corporations disclose their status in the communica-
tion to potential investors. Currently, there are no affirmative 
disclosure requirements for any company utilizing the newly 
available platforms for advertising and solicitation.191 The SEC 
should set minimum disclosure requirements regarding the na-
ture of the benefit corporation on these solicitations. Generally, 
these disclosures should include three fundamental elements. 
First, the legislation should require self-identification as a ben-
efit corporation. Second, information regarding the nature of a 
benefit corporation should be included. Third, the solicitation 
communication should direct potential investors to the compa-
ny website, where they can find the benefit report for more in-
formation regarding the nature of the business.  
Although these proposed disclosures are not as comprehen-
sive as those proposed for benefit corporations utilizing equity 
crowdfunding, the advertising and solicitation platform for 
benefit corporations poses fewer risks for investors. This is be-
cause solicitation occurs before the transaction between the in-
vestor and the benefit corporation occurs. Additionally, the 
mandated sophistication of the targeted investor under this 
funding platform adds a level of protection for the investor.192 
Again, the SEC may be hesitant to require additional disclo-
sures, but the fraud deterring values of such disclosures far 
outweigh the minimal effort necessary to inform potential in-
vestors about the fundamental difference between a benefit 
corporation and a traditional corporation.  
 
 191. See Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and 
General Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, 78 Fed. Reg. 
44,771, 44,771 (July 24, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239, 242) 
(explaining the currently required disclosures, which do not include affirma-
tive disclosures regarding business entity or operations). 
 192. See Guttentag, supra note 103, at 249. 
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Ultimately, these affirmative disclosure regulations would 
prove extremely beneficial to protect those seeking to invest in 
benefit corporations through JOBS Act funding platforms. Ra-
ther than react to issues of fraud and misinformation, these 
regulatory measures suggest a unique way to prevent them. 
Such measures are crucial to secure a successful future for ben-
efit corporations and investors as they seek to utilize these new 
funding platforms. 
  CONCLUSION   
Benefit corporations are a new type of business entity that 
continues to increase in both number and popularity for small 
businesses and entrepreneurs. This growth will be facilitated 
through the equity crowdfunding and solicitation platforms 
available to small and startup business under the JOBS Act. 
However, without affirmative disclosure requirements, those 
investors utilizing JOBS Act funding platforms could be at a 
serious risk if they unknowingly invest in a benefit corporation 
believing it to be a traditional corporation. Both state benefit 
corporation legislation and the SEC’s regulation under the 
JOBS Act lack necessary investor protection measures. Thus, 
benefit corporations, which are largely untested and are al-
ready under critical scrutiny, could have their reputation and 
popularity seriously undermined if issues arise in their utiliza-
tion of JOBS Act funding platforms. Without precautions to 
protect and educate investors, the success of benefit corpora-
tions could be considerably hindered. Although the current 
regulations lack necessary affirmative disclosures to protect 
uninformed investors who may be attracted to benefit corpora-
tions, with greater regulatory safeguards in place, the JOBS 
Act has the potential to facilitate the growth and success of 
benefit corporations. Such safeguards would be far more effec-
tive as a preventative rather than reactive measure. Imple-
menting simple affirmative disclosure regulations would pro-
tect the future of benefit corporations and the investors seeking 
to make a return on their investment while promoting these 
mission-based companies.  
 
